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1. Introduction
International trade theory, based on neoclassical growth models, predicts
that the lifting of barriers to trade and to the free movement of factors
associated with a process of integration not only enhance the general economic
welfare of the integrated area, but  lead to real convergence among its member
countries. Nevertheless, doubt is cast on this optimistic result if one looks at the
recent growth and geography models. Thus, on the basis of these models, real
convergence across countries is not the only possible outcome. Indeed, due to
economic phenomena such as differences in production technologies,
increasing return to scale, positive agglomeration externalities and transport
costs, an increasingly uneven spatial distribution of economic welfare (real
divergence) may take place.
In addition, empirical evidence on the issue is far from being conclusive,
because apart from the ambiguity of theoretical predictions there are various
ways to define and measure real convergence. In this sense, there is a
widespread agreement that the integration of Europe led to substantial
economic benefits for the European Union (and even more for the European
Economic and Monetary Union) as a whole. It is less clear, however, whether
the process of integration is being conducive to real convergence among
member countries. In fact, spatial economic disparities between the current
fifteen EU partners are an important issue which has fuelled the long-standing
economic and political debate which is on the basis of the development of the
Community Regional Policy.  Moreover, the prospect of the new enlargement of
the EU with the accession of the Central and Eastern European Countries
(CEECs), with a much lower level of development than the present members,
has intensified the interest in the issue of the possibilities for real convergence
within the EU.
In this context, the main purpose of this study is to provide an assessment of
the different experiences of convergence of the four less developed EU
members (Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece) after joining the EU and their
main determining factors. In addition, it aims to draw conclusions for these5
experiences that may help in the elaboration of suitable strategies of accession
for the CEEC candidates.
Accordingly, we will begin (section 2) by discussing the meaning of real
convergence and offering a critical survey of the most common methods used in
its assessing, which includes a proposal in an attempt to avoid some of their
shortcomings. Then, in section 3, we summarize what we can learn from the
recent endogenous growth and new geography models about the capability of
Regional Economic Agreements for producing both divergent and convergent
tendencies in economic wealth of member countries. Against this theoretical
background, in  section 4 , we explore, first, the nature and trends of real
convergence of the four less developed EU members using the measures
proposed before and, second, the explanatory factors that can account for their
varying performances. Here special emphasis is placed on the assessment of
their respective capital stocks, both physical and intangible, given their essential
influence on growth and, consequently, on economic welfare. In section 5 we
discuss the extent to which the experiences of those EU Member States are
useful for the design of an appropriate strategy for the CEECs which have
already began the formal process of negotiation for their accession to the EU. In
this respect, we not only take into account what can be drawn from the different
catch-up experiences of the four laggard members, but also what we know
about the main economic features of the Central and Eastern European
candidates. Finally, section 6 offers some final remarks.
2. Real convergence: meaning and assessing
Broadly speaking, economic convergence in an area formed by different
countries (regions) is understood to mean the increasing alignment of the
economic variables considered, due to the greater advance of the laggard
countries (regions), and not to the deterioration of the more developed ones. In
this respect, two types of economic convergence are usually considered:6
nominal and real. Nominal convergence refers to the tendency towards greater
uniformity of nominal variables (those indicative of macroeconomic stability).
Real convergence expresses the approximation of the levels of economic
welfare, generally proxied by per capita GDP. As was said our analysis here will
be focussed on real convergence.
The above definition of real convergence is not, however, very useful in
the sense that it cannot be used to arrive at a clear-cut diagnosis of a specific
situation. In fact, what we have in the specialized literature -see Baumol, Nelson
and Wolff (1994), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), Quah (1993, 1996) and
Grossman (1996) for references- is a wealth of measures and an open debate
on their relative merits.
The simplest indicator for assessing real convergence between countries
(regions) within an area is to test whether the relative per capita GDP of a
country (region) or a set of countries has approached the average of the area.
The two most popular measures are: the beta-convergence and sigma-
convergence. The former implies that the poor countries (regions) grow faster
than the richer ones and it is generally tested by regressing the growth in per
capita GDP on its initial level for a given cross-section of countries (regions). In
turn, this  beta-convergence covers two types of convergence: absolute and
conditional (on a factor or a set of factors in addition to the initial level of per
capita GDP). Whereas by sigma-convergence we mean the reduction of per
capita GDP dispersion within a sample of countries (regions). See Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1995:11) for further details.
The methodology proposed by Barro and Sala-i-Martin to test  beta-
convergence has been criticized for producing biased results. In this sense, in
Quah (1993 and 1996) it is argued that it largely neglects the dynamics of
changing national (regional) income distributions. In addition, this author
identifies a tendency towards “twin peaks” in the cross country distribution, so
that the world appears to polarize into distinct classes of income. In other
words, countries seem to follow different growth paths and to converge to7
distinct steady states, so that they tend to cluster around different levels of per
capita GDP. In this respect, Quah (1995) proposes the use of a very complex
method based on the use of Markov chains to capture the dynamics of the
entire cross-county distribution.
  More recently, Boyle and McCarthy (1997 and 1999) have suggested
the use of the Kendall index of rank concordance –referred to as  gamma-
convergence- in addition to sigma-convergence in testing for beta-convergence.
That measure seems, therefore, more adequate to capture the possible mobility
of countries (regions) within the distribution of income levels over time.
In any event, it may be claimed that none of the existing procedures is
generally accepted as inherently superior to the others in any circumstances. In
fact, what we find is a wide agreement about the idea that the relative merits of
each of them may differ depending on what the purpose of the empirical
analysis is. In this context, and given that our purpose in this paper is only to
assess the achievement in real convergence for each of the four cohesion
countries within the EU, it seems sensible to use the simplest of the above
mentioned indicators: the trend in the gap to the EU average. In fact, this is the
indicator most commonly used when, as in this case, the objective is to analyze
the relative catch-up process of a single country within a given area.
However, here we will go beyond other studies in addressing what we
think is one of the main and unfairly neglected problems in the debate on the
assessment of real convergence: the insufficiency of per capita GDP as a proxy
of the country levels of economic welfare. Indeed, this debate is too much
focussed on the selection of the most reliable statistical measures of
convergence in  per capita  GDP and too little on the search for other
complementary variables, such as the degree of income inequality, that provide
a better assessment of real convergence. In part, this bias is a consequence of
the paucity of income distribution data (see Atkinson, 1999, for further details)
1.
                                                
1 Slesnick (1998) offers a good survey on the different theoretical and empirical approaches to
evaluating economic and social welfare. For a comprehensive review of the theoretical and
methodological problems in analyzing inequality and welfare, see Cowell (1999). Aghion, Caroli8
Thus, we have not got complete and internationally homogenous and updated
series of what is the most common measurement of income distribution: the
Gini coefficients.
In any event, we think it is possible and desirable to use other variables
that can somehow capture the differences in the inequality across countries and
across time. Among them, we have decided to use in our empirical analysis the
share of social protection expenditure in GDP, given the quite high level of
correlation that –as shown in FIGURE 1- this variable seems to have with the
Gini coefficients.
[FIGURE 1 around here]
In addition, for a better qualification of per capita  GDP as a proxy of
country level of economic welfare in empirical analysis of real convergence, we
propose to use also the rate of unemployment. Indeed, it seems reasonable to
state that, among two countries having a similar level of per capita GDP, the
one with a lower rate of unemployment enjoys of a higher living standard.
Moreover, we argue that in order to arrive to a more helpful assessment
of real convergence one should also evaluate the capability of the countries
(regions) in question for having a self-sustained economic growth. This means,
therefore, the need to take into account the factors that, according to the
soundest economic growth literature, constitute the main determinants of
growth in productivity and income in the medium and long term. In this respect,
even when – as shown in more detail in the next section- there is not a
consensus, we find a marked coincidence in their emphasis on the importance
of certain intangible assets, especially human and technological capital, as
essential ingredients of growth. The emphasis placed on these factors does not
exclude, however, the relevance of physical capital. In fact, many of the studies
indicate that some types of physical capital, such as transport and
                                                                                                                                              
and Garcia-Peñalosa (1999) explore the relationship between inequality and economic growth
from the perspective of the new growth models.9
communication infrastructure, stand out for their special impact on productivity
and economic growth.
In short, in an attempt to overcome the caveats of previous empirical
analysis of real convergence based solely on the use of the values of per capita
GDP, and occasionally the rate of unemployment as a complementary variable,
we propose the use of a set of indicators. On the one hand, three variables
which try to measure the current level of economic welfare taking into account
the importance of the distributive issues: per capita GDP (in terms of PPP),
unemployment rate and social protection expenditure/GDP (%). And, on the
other hand, at least two other variables that seem to best reflect the capability
for having a self-sustained economic growth: the stocks of human and
technological capital.
Consequently, in our empirical analysis of real convergence for Spain,
Portugal, Ireland and Greece within the EU, we will use the above- mentioned
set of indicators as the starting basis. They will be, however, supplemented with
others that help to achieve a more in-depth diagnosis on the factors underlying
real convergence. In any event, before starting that empirical analysis, we
should review in some more detail the soundest ideas in the recent growth and
geography models, regarding the implications of economic integration on real
convergence.
3. Regional Economic Integration and real convergence
This section does not provide a comprehensive survey of the wealth of
recent theoretical and empirical work on the question of the extent to which
economic integration processes are conducive to real convergence between
member countries. Its rather less ambitious objective is to briefly review the
main findings in recent literature on growth behavior across economies and its
implications for the above posed question.
As we know, neoclassical growth models -as in Solow (1956) and his
following versions, for example Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992)- imply10
convergence between poor and rich countries (regions). Assuming that
technologies are identical and exogenous, the mechanism behind convergence
rest on decreasing returns to scale to capital: countries (regions) with low
capital stocks and per capita income should have a higher marginal product and
return to capital. This should therefore lead to more capital accumulation and
faster growth in poor countries (regions) than in rich ones.
Consequently, opening up the country (region) –as happens in the
framework of an integration process- should only accelerate the convergence
process, as capital should flow to capital-scarce countries (regions) to benefit
from higher returns. This is, in fact, the line of reasoning that is the conventional
theory of economic integration developed since the pioneering work of Viner
(1950)
2. Thus, those models -sharing the assumptions of neoclassical growth
theory-  predict a tendency of member countries, prices, costs and income
levels to converge, with trade and international factor mobility acting as the
convergence mechanisms. This process of real convergence is further
stimulated in the case of monetary union by the reduction of transaction costs
and the elimination of foreign-exchange uncertainty.
Contrary to the neoclassical paradigm, the new growth theory does not
predict that income convergence between rich and poor countries (regions) is
the only possible outcome
3. Thus, according to one of its first contributions,
Romer (1986), returns to capital do not have to be diminishing. From this it
follows, therefore, that the impact of economic integration on convergence is not
so clear as in the Solow setting. In the approach proposed in Lucas (1988),
where human capital with increasing returns is the main driving force of
economic growth, the possibility of the brain drain acting as a vehicle of cross
country growth divergence is considered. Finally, some versions of endogenous
growth models that, in  the same vein as Romer's (1990), have emphasized the
importance of commercially oriented R&D efforts as the main engine of growth,
                                                
2 Hine (1994) and Baldwin and Venables (1995) offer revisions of the theory and summarize the
results of the main empirical studies.
3 A detail view of endogenous growth models developed since the early 1980s can be found in
Barro and Sala-i- Martin (1995); Grossman (1996) and Aghion and Howitt (1998), and a recent
survey of the empirical evidence is presented in Temple (1999).11
may also explain the existence of permanent, and under some circumstances,
even widening, technological and income gaps between countries.
In addition, the new geography literature pioneered by Krugman (1991)
and reviewed in Ottaviano and Puga (1998) pose several reasons, in particular
the existence of agglomeration economies, to explain why economic integration
may lead to a pattern of increased spatial income inequality.
Nevertheless, many versions of endogenous growth models point to
more optimistic prospects for international convergence. A characteristic feature
of these models is that they assume the existence of knowledge spillover
effects of an international scope. Thus, by considering that imitation is cheaper
than innovation, these models imply that convergence through technological
diffusion is a likely outcome
4. Apart from taking into account contracts for
transfer of technology, they emphasize the role of trade and foreign direct
investment as channels for technology spillovers.
Studies that –as Nadiri (1993), Nadiri and Kim (1996), Coe and Helpman
(1995), and Keller (1999)- are focussed on technology spillovers spread by
trade underline the special importance of transactions in intermediate goods.
Yet they also admit this role for trade in final goods in particular in those ones
that allow for reversal engineering practices by the import country. As for the
technology spillover effects through foreign direct investments, there are a great
number of studies – see for example Blomström and Wolff (1994), and Baldwin,
Braconier and Forslid (1999) and references there in- which agree on its
importance for growth in the host countries.
In this respect, the most elaborated and realistic formulations of
innovation-driven growth models also stress the complementarity between both
domestic R&D and foreign R&D spillovers and human capital investments.
Thus, both the level (stock) and rate of investment in human capital prove
                                                
4 Note here that historians have always argued that technology transfer favored by relatively
cheap imitation –what Gerschenkron called the “advantage of backwardness” is a key driving
force behind economic growth.12
crucial for growth not only as a separate factor but also as a complement for
exploiting the effects of new technologies created by either domestic or foreign
innovation efforts
5.  In this sense, human capital is usually considered as an
essential condition for convergence.
In addition, some studies – see as an example Aschauer 1989, 2000;
Munnell 1990; Easterly and Rebelo, 1993 and Argimon et al. (1997) -
underscore the importance of public capital in general, and more specifically the
endowment of infrastructure, because of their significant positive externalities
on the productivity of companies. Those externalities seem to be particularly big
in the case of the transport and communication infrastructure (Easterly and
Rebelo 1993; Roller and Waverman, 1994). Moreover, as for
telecommunication and the internet infrastructure, it has been put forward how
important they are for the technological upgrading of  the whole productive
system  (Crandall, 1997 and Koski and Majumdar, 2000).
Interestingly, some authors argue that at the present time those
infrastructures associated with telecommunications and the internet are a key
determining factor of growth given their crucial role in the diffusion of the drastic
innovations that have been taking place in the last few years. In this respect, the
term  general purpose technologies  has been coined  (Bresnahan and
Trajtenberg, 1995) to refer to a certain type of drastic innovation, such as the
Internet, that has the potential for pervasive use in a wide range of sectors in
ways that radically change their modes of operation. In fact, we already have a
significant number of insightful studies, which illustrate the nature of general
purpose technologies, the Internet in particular, and their far-reaching and
enduring implications for economic growth and welfare (see Helpman, 1998 and
references therein).
                                                
5 Indeed, as argued in Cannon (2000), there is a tendency to integrate the two existing
approaches to analizing the relationship between education and growth. The first, initiated by
Lucas (1988) is based on the idea that growth is primarily driven by the rate of accumulation of
human capital. The second, which has its origin in the contribution by Nelson and Phelps
(1966), describes growth as being driven by the stock of human capital, which in turn affects a
country´s ability to generate and imitate technical progress.13
What is more, for some of the supporters of this view those radical and
pervasive innovations in the area of information and communication
technologies imply the birth of the so termed “new economy”. What is meant
with this is a revolutionary change in the modes of production and in the
behavior of both economic agents and institutions, which is making our inherited
economic knowledge obsolete. Without going so far, one cannot but admit the
paramount importance of those new technologies as determinants of both the
level and the “quality” of economic growth.
Before concluding this brief review of recent literature on economic
growth and related issues -in a search for a useful guide for our empirical
assessment of real convergence - we should include some mention to the
studies that have analyzed the relationship between nominal and real
convergence.
This topic has recently drawn considerable and increasing attention in
view of the quite large number of countries that are experiencing a rapid and
non-inflationary growth accompanied by a significant generation of employment
in a framework of a stringent fiscal policy (see Perotti (1996) and Alessina and
Perotti (1995,1996). Such experiences have somehow cast doubt on some
hypothesis on the impact of consolidation policies on growth, which were
generally considered conventional wisdom. In this sense, it is argued that the
increasing globalization of markets at a world level is resulting in a greater
importance of the credibility effect associated with strict stabilizing policies,
which allows for a reduction in the risk premium in interest rates on international
financial markets. However, together with these findings one should keep in
mind the other evidence mentioned above concerning the significant role that
government investments play in growth, in particular in the case of investments
in areas such as education, R&D and transport and communications
infrastructures.
Summing up, the literature reviewed above leaves one with rather
inconclusive predictions as to the question of whether or not economic14
integration is able to procure real convergence between country members by
itself.
Thus, when the rather rigid assumptions of the pure neoclassical growth
model are relaxed, particularly that production technologies are identical and
exogenous across countries, opening up to trade and factor mobility may
become a source of divergence. Indeed, in some versions of endogenous
growth models integration, although still leading to aggregate welfare gains,
may be conducive to income polarization processes.
Nevertheless, the majority of evidence available suggests that a trend
towards real convergence is the most likely outcome, although it is generally
considered that this will be a kind of conditioned convergence. More specifically,
what is suggested is the need that laggard member countries have for boosting
efficient investments to enlarge and improve their endowments in all those kinds
of capital assets with special influence on growth, namely: technology, human
capital and infrastructure. In addition, most of those models argue that the
existence of international technological spillovers make it possible to implement
a strategy of growth based on a less costly way of imitation of foreign
innovations, provided they manage to have a good enough human capital
endowment. Here it is also underlined how important it is for any strategy of
growth to have the provision of good telecommunication infrastructures.  In
addition, the need for keeping a climate of macroeconomic stability that favors
the investments in all those kinds of capital assets required to achieve a
sustained economic growth has been pointed out as well.
4. Real convergence within the EU: the case of the four laggard members
In our assessment of the real convergence patterns of the four cohesion
EU countries, we will start by looking at the simplest indicator: the trend of their
respective per capita GDP in relation to the EU average, expressed in PPS15
(Purchasing Power Standard)
6. Specifically, FIGURE 2 shows the evolution of
this indicator for Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Greece and, in order to have the
leader reference, also for USA, over the 1960-2000 period. It should be pointed
out that all the laggard members have managed to narrow the gap deficit to the
EU average, but there are significant differences between them. Ireland is the
most successful of the four and Greece the least
7.
[FIGURE 2 around here]
The intensity of the catch-up process has varied over the time, so that,
with the sole exception of Greece in the early years after its accession, the
cohesion countries show a better performance after their membership
8. The
case of Ireland proves to be particularly impressive in this respect. Thus, over
the 90s no other EU member has been able to match its outstanding growth
performance. Such differences across member countries suggest, therefore,
that far from being spontaneous their respective process of real convergence is
largely attributable to differences in their respective growth strategies.
In this respect, on the basis of a simple arithmetic exercise, it is possible
break down the per capita GDP growth of every country into its components, in
the way that is carefully explained in BOX 1. Thus, it is shown that a country's
per capita GDP growth hinges on an increase in labor productivity  -which in
turn can be broken down into variations in working time and in hourly
productivity- and on employment rate growth.
                                                
6  The purchasing power standard (PPS) is defined in such a way that, for each individual
aggregate, the European Union total obtained from converting the values in national currency
with the purchasing power parities is equal to the European Union total for that individual
aggregate in ecus/euros. In a sense, the PPS can therefore be thought of as the ecu/euro in
real terms (EUROSTAT, 1999).
7 It should be noted that the brilliant performance of the Irish economy in terms of GDP growth is
not so clear in terms of GNP, given the huge importance of the activities of the multinational
companies located in this country.
8 Ben-David (1993, 2000) shows that members of the European Economic Community had
experienced greater income convergence than in the industrialised countries as a whole.16
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h: Working time (in yearly hours per person)
Hp: Hourly productivity












Eap: Economically active population
The result of this exercise of breakdown of per capita GDP growth for
every country over the period of reference - that here and in the rest of the
paper will be from 1980 onwards-  are presented in TABLE 1 and also, in a
more intuitive way, in FIGURE 3
9.  As both of them show, the major part of per
capita GDP in all countries has been due to the significant increases in labor
productivity. Once more, the case of Ireland deserves a special mention. Here it
should be pointed out that the case of the Irish economy is outstanding not only
                                                
9 For a correct interpretation one should note that those figures are not expressed in absolute
but in relative terms. Specifically, they represent the contribution (in percentage) of each
component to the per capita GDP growth in each country.17
for its impressive labor productivity growth but also for its capability for
increasing its employment rate. Productivity gains in Spain are also outstanding
in comparison with the EU average (and higher than that of Portugal), specially
taking into account the significant reduction experienced in its working time. In
this respect, it is interesting to remark that the Spanish gains in labour
productivity have been mainly due to the "pure hourly growth effect" (see
TABLE 1).
[TABLE 1 and FIGURE 3, around here]
The differences in the catch-up experiences across countries are
reinforced when we exam the two indicators that –given the paucity of proper
data to elaborate better ones- we have decided to use to approach the
distributive dimension of economic growth: the unemployment rate and social
expenditure/GDP. In this respect, a glance at the level and trend of these two
indicators in relation to the EU normalized average, represented (together with
other indicators that we will comment later on) in FIGURE 4 reveals striking
differences between the four countries.
[FIGURE 4 around here]
Looking at the share of social protection in relation to GDP, Spain stands
out for having the most sustained and highest value
10. On the contrary, the
relative effort devoted to finance the Welfare State has been diminishing
significantly in Ireland, the country with the best growth performance. We are
aware that the use of the increases in the relative social protection expenditures
as a test for rising inequality has some shortcomings. In this respect, the fact
that social expenditure have decline in Ireland may, for instance, reflect a robust
unemployment growth. Nevertheless, given the significant correlation that  -as
we reported in FIGURE 1-  we found between the share of social protection
                                                
10 Note that according to the value of the Gini coefficient, calculated on the basis of the
European Community Household Panel published by EUROSTAT, Spain was in 1994 the
country with the most egalitarian distribution of income among the four cohesion EU countries
and Ireland the one with the least.18
expenditures and the Gini index for inequality, it seems reasonable to use the
former as a proxy of the latter. Moreover, a closer look to the data of Ireland
provides two additional pieces of evidence. First, that the reduction experienced
by its social protection expenditures is significantly higher than that of
unemployment expenditures. That the Gini index has increased from 0,32,  in
1987, to 0,35, in 1994.
As far as the rate of unemployment is concerned, the case of Spain
should also be pointed out, but in this case due to its extraordinary and
persistent high level, which only in the last few years has been registering a
dramatic drop.
Proceeding with our aim of achieving to an adequate diagnosis of real
convergence experiences for less developed EU members, we will now take
into account the factors that seem the most suitable to assess their relative
capability for having a self-sustained growth. As we argued in section 3, for that
purpose it seems appropriate to evaluate each country's relative endowment in
the factors that, according to the soundest theoretical and empirical evidence,
are the main determinants of growth in the medium and long term: the stocks of
technological and human capital. Their measurement, however, still poses
many problems. Yet, we think it is possible to obtain a good proxy for both of
them.
As for the stock of technological capital, there is a wide consensus in
considering that it can be reasonably approached by the accumulation of the
R&D spending following the perpetual inventory method
11. We have, therefore,
applied this method to the series of data of R&D provided by the OECD since
1973, using as a deflator that of Gross Fixed Capital Formation and assuming a
depreciation rate of 10%.
                                                
11 The use of the R&D expenditures as an indicator for the technological development has
received two kinds of criticism. On the one hand, it has been claimed that R&D spending is an
overstated measure of the efforts in technological activities in view of the high rates of failures
that are likely to occur in R&D projects. On the other hand, others have argued its
understatement, because it does not include the payments for imports of technology.19
As regards the estimation of human capital stock, it should be pointed out
that the best procedure used up to now is that followed in Barro and Lee (1993
and 1996). That is to say: to approach the human stock of a country in terms of
the level of training of its working-age population according to the years of
schooling at all levels of education. This is, therefore, the method that
essentially we will follow here. However, we will introduce an improvement
trying to overcome the criticisms that the Barro and Lee (1993 and 1996)
estimates have received, namely: not taking into the consideration the likely
differences of quality across the Education Systems of the countries.
Consequently, our estimated series of human capital stock introduce a
correction, based on data on the cross country differences in education
expenditure per student at every level of teaching, in an attempt to get data in
terms of the same quality standard.
The estimated values for these two real convergence indicators for
Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Greece and USA –all of them in relation to those of the
EU average; EU= 100-  in the years 1980 and 1999 are presented in the same
FIGURE 4 and in more detail in FIGURE 5. From examining these figures, and
as regards technological capital, we deduce, among other things, that all the
cohesion countries, with the exception of Ireland, are far-removed from the EU
average (which in turn is lagged in relation to USA). The gap deficit has,
however, diminished significantly, excepting the case of Ireland, over time. This
is explained by the stronger rate of investment in R&D in the most backward
member countries during most of the period of reference and by the slowdown
in R&D spending in some countries, such as Germany, which have a bigger
stock of technological capital.
[FIGURE 5 around here]
As for the stock of human capital, in which the deficit in the EU in relation
to the USA is certainly large, the cohesion countries also show a significant but
decreasing gap (excepting in Greece) in relation to the EU average. Among the
laggard countries we should underline the special efforts made by the Spanish
economy.20
In overall, the differentials found in the level and path of the stocks of
technological and human capital stocks across the four cohesion countries
appear to confirm the hypothesis of the endogenous growth theories, which
stress the important role of those factors for growth and economic real
convergence of countries.
In any event, looking for additional insights into the real convergence
patterns in those countries, we will now analyze their endowments in physical
capital. Although here we will consider all kinds of physical capital, we will focus
on  the varieties that, according to previous studies (which were mentioned in
section 3), have a greater impact on growth due to their significant positive
externalities on the productivity of companies: transport and communications
and above all the Internet infrastructures.
We have proceeded, first of all, to estimate the stocks of private physical
capital of Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Greece, the EU and USA, on the basis of the
accumulation of the respective series of private Gross Fixed Capital Formation
(GFCF), conveniently deflated and depreciated, under the Perpetual Inventory
Method. Then, the stocks of public capital have been obtained by applying the
same procedure to the corresponding series of public GFCF. Finally, the
transport infrastructure endowment of each country has been estimated by
calculating the arithmetic mean of the availability of kilometers of “standard
motorway” per square Km. and per capita
12.
The values estimated for all those kinds of physical capital endowment
are shown in FIGURE 6. Its examination discloses new features about the
catch-up experiences of the countries in question. Thus, as expected, the
physical capital endowment, especially that of a public nature and even more so
that taking the form of transport infrastructure, is larger in the those member
countries that have been more successful in narrowing their per capita GDP to
                                                
12 The kilometers of “standard motorway” were calculated by using the kilometers available in
each type of motorway, under the following criterion: 1Km. of motorway was assumed to equal
16 Km. of state roads, 32 Km. of provincial roads and 64 Km. of local and urban roads.21
the EU average. As for the dynamic of investment, the case of Spain proves
quite impressive for its particularly good performance.
[FIGURE 6 around here]
Once we have explored the levels and trends in capital stocks both
tangible and intangible, underlying the per capita GDP catch-up processes of
the laggard EU members it is time to take a step forward. Specifically, it seems
interesting to analyze the likely contribution of international technological
spillovers.
Indeed, as was mentioned in section 3, recent growth literature has not
only emphasized the importance of domestic R&D and human capital
investments, but also that of the international diffusion of technology, through
different channels. Thus, in addition to the most conventional and direct
channel, the international contracts for transfer of technology, new models have
stressed two other indirect ways for international diffusion of technology, due to
the assumed existence of knowledge spillover effects: trade and foreign direct
investment. Consequently, in these models, given a level of domestic stock of
technological and human capital, the processes of opening up and integration of
a country will tend to raise its rates of growth.
Following this line of reasoning, we will pursue our  analysis of real
convergence for the four target countries by trying to approach the relative
importance of their capability to benefit from foreign technological innovations
through the three channels mentioned above.
In view of the fact that those countries have concentrated their imports of
goods and technology as well as their direct investment inflows in the OECD
countries, we will consider this area as the origin of all their knowledge
spillovers through each of these ways. To begin with, we have estimated the
extent of technological spillovers coming from technological imports on the
basis of the accumulation of the series of technological payments under the
perpetual inventory method. As for the spillovers incorporated in the direct22
investment inflows, we have calculated a weighted average of each of the
OECD member countries using as weights the stocks of foreign capital received
from each of them. Finally, technological spillovers through imports of goods
have been estimated by an analogous procedure but here using as weights the
imports coming from each one of the OECD countries. More details about the
data sources and the procedure used for the measurement of these spillovers
are provided in BOX 2 below.
 BOX 2. MEASUREMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGICAL
SPILLOVERS BY CHANNELS














Fc: Stock of foreign capital in country i from country j. The values of this
variable were obtained from OECD: International Direct Investment
Statistics Yearbook. Given the disparities found between data for the
source and host countries, the statistics had to undergo a data-
editing process.
Tk: Stock of technological capital. The data of each country was
estimated on the basis of the accumulation of R&D expenditure under
the perpetual inventory method (with a lag of two years) and
assuming a 10% depreciation rate, based on data obtained from
OECD: Main Science and Technology Indicators; Basic Science and
Technology Statistics; and Research and Development Expenditure
in Industry.
Phk: Physical capital. The data of  each country was estimated on the
basis of the accumulation of investment flows under the perpetual
inventory method. The series on the GFCF (Gross Fixed Capital
Formation) and their deflators are those which figure in OECD:
National Accounts, Vol. 1, Main Aggregates. The depreciation rate is
5,4% and was obtained from EUROSTAT (1997).
i and j are referred to the host and the source country of the flows of
foreign capital.
n is the number of countries considered. In this case all OECD
countries.

















M: Imports of country i from country j. The data on bilateral trade flows
were drawn from the IMF: Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook. To
overcome the problem of the lack of coincidence between the trade data
from the standpoint of imports (fob) and of exports (fob), the
arithmetical mean between both of them was calculated.
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where,
Mtm: Accumulated technological imports from 1973, calculated by the
perpetual inventory method.
tm: technological imports per year obtained from IMF: Balance of
Payments Statistics Yearbook, EUROSTAT: Balance of Payments.
Quarterly Statistics and OECD: Basic Science and Technology
Statistics.
d: Depreciation rate. In this case the depreciation rate is 10% as in
Mohnen et al. (1986) and Bernstein and Nadiri (1989).
p: Deflator of Gross Fixed Capital Formation obtained from OECD:
National Accounts. Vol. I: Main Aggregates
The results obtained in our estimation of the importance of those three
channels of diffusion of foreign technologies are represented in FIGURE 7. As
expected, in the light of their relatively lower stocks of technological capital from
a domestic origin, technological change in the four less developed EU countries
seems to have been based to a great extent on the diffusion of foreign
innovations.
[FIGURE 7 around here]24
A short glance at the different channels reveals some interesting
features. Apart from the leading role of imports in all countries, the most salient
feature is, in our view, the extraordinary importance of foreign direct investment
in Ireland and also, although to a lesser degree, in Spain and Portugal.
Moreover, as it has been argued in other places (see OECD, 1999 and Barry,
1999) foreign direct investment has played a crucial role not only in the
technological modernization but also in the transformation of the Irish economy.
The traditional scarcity of inward investment flows in Greece makes the rather
poor performance of this country as regards labor productivity easier to
understand.
A more descriptive analysis of the trends of direct investment inflows in
each country - which have given rise to cumulative data graphically reported in
FIGURE 7-  reflects that in the case of Ireland the bulk of them have taken
place since the beginning of the 90s, (see FIGURE 8), that is to say, since the
eve of the formation of the European Single Market. The major share of those
capital inflows come from USA and are concentrated in a rather small number
of sectors which exhibit a salient export performance. All those facts suggest,
therefore, that Ireland has been chosen as a base to supply all the EU market.
[FIGURE 8 around here]
It is interesting to denote that this inward direct investment boom seems
to have been on the basis of the clear reorientation of both productive and trade
structures towards skilled-labor and technology-intensive sectors observed in
the 90s in the Irish economy. In this sense, it is of interest to note that, as
reported in FIGURE 9, the trend in foreign direct investment and that
corresponding to the share of technology-intensive sectors have gone in
parallel. In addition, in OECD (1999) it is documented in more detail that inward
investment has been vital in the creation of an export-oriented, skilled-labor-
intensive sector, concentrated in areas such as electronics, pharmaceuticals
and corporate services. 
[FIGURE 9 around here]25
Another revealing proof of the important efforts made by the Irish
economy to develop intensive technology sectors, specifically those related to
the Internet, is its relatively good endowment infrastructure in this field in
relation to the EU standards.  The set of telecommunication and Internet
infrastructure indicators reported in FIGURE 10 is rather eloquent in this sense:
Ireland's figures are in all cases very close to the EU average and in some of
them even above. Here it is important to underline the outstanding position of
Ireland as regards the provision of secure web servers, given that this is an
electronic commerce indicator. It seems, therefore, that Ireland is more aware
than the average of its EU partners of  the importance a country's
telecommunications infrastructure for its economic development.
[FIGURE 10 around here]
As regards the other EU cohesion countries, their position in the ranking,
which results from the comparison of their respective telecommunication and
Internet facilities, is rather familiar: Spain is in the first place and Greece in the
last one.
One additional piece of relevant information for understanding the
disparities observed among the real convergence patterns of the four countries
is the different course that has been followed by their main macroeconomic
indicators. Certainly, as discussed in section 3, the increasing globalization of
international markets has heightened the importance of macroeconomic stability
as a condition for economic growth and consequently for real convergence.
Moreover, for the EU members a set of rather demanding criteria of
macroeconomic stability were established in the founding Treaty on European
Union - known as the Maastricht Treaty- to decide which countries qualified for
accession to the European and Monetary Union.
In that respect, we have considered it of interest to report –in TABLE 2-
the trends of the most important macroeconomic indicators included in such26
criteria for the four cohesion countries, for the UE average and for USA over the
period in question.
[TABLE 2, around here]
As seen in that table, prices have undergone a very significant process of
moderation, most notably during the last part of the period. Logically, a similar
process has taken place in interest rates. As regards the budget deficit, the
consolidation efforts that have been made in all countries are generally
concentrated in the last 90s
13. The case of Ireland deserves special mention in
that, despite having the highest deficit in the 80s, now it is the only one of the
four having a budget surplus. What is more, apart from eliminating its budget
deficit the Irish economy has been able to greatly diminish its public gross debt
substantially, in clear contrast with what has happened in the case of the Greek
economy. In addition, it should be pointed out that Greece has waited more
than any of its counterparts to correct its large fiscal imbalance.  Consequently,
the macroeconomic performance of the EU cohesion countries, in overall,
suggests that macro-policies are of considerable importance for growth
performance and real convergence success.
Needless to say, diagnosis of the real convergence achievements in the
EU cohesion countries would be very limited if it did not discuss the contribution
of the EU regional policy. We will devote, therefore, the last part of this section
to a brief consideration of this important issue.
Although in the first years of the European integration regional policy was
considered a rather insignificant issue, since the first enlargement in 1973  -
when Denmark, Ireland and United Kingdom joined the Union-  regional policy
has being gaining in importance within Community policy, so that today it
absorbs about one third of the EU budget. The main purpose of EU regional
policy is to improve the long-term growth prospects of the less prosperous
                                                
13 For a largely documented analysis on the fiscal policies in Spain and the rest of the fifteen EU
members since mid 80s see Martin (2000: chap. 5).27
regions. Consequently, the most benefited countries are the four less developed
members, which are the target of our analysis. The bulk of the actions, which
should be  co-financed by national public funding, are devoted to enhance
human capital endowments and infrastructures.
 According to the periodical reports prepared by the Commission (see
EC, 1999 for the latest) and other available studies (Martin, 2000: chap. 11 and
others refereed there in), EU regional policy has exerted a positive effect on the
narrowing the per capita income gaps across member countries. In this context,
the ranking of the most benefited countries in terms of the net revenues
received from the EU budget as a share of their respective GDP are: Ireland,
Greece, Portugal and Spain (see TABLE 3). This ranking somehow provides
another reason to explain the outstanding economic performance of the Irish
economy, but at the same time it adds an additional open question on the
explanation of the Greek case. Nevertheless, in view of our previous analysis of
the catch-up experiences of the four cohesion countries it is quite safe to
conclude that: EU regional policy can contribute to regional convergence but not
to the extent as to compensate for the absence of a stable, growth-promoting
macroeconomic environment.
[TABLE 3, around here]
In short, from our analysis of the real convergence patterns of the four
less developed countries in the EU we can conclude that during the period in
question all of them have managed to advance in terms of real convergence
with respect to the EU. We have found, however, that the process of
convergence has been rather different both in degree and in nature across
countries. Ireland is the country with the most successful per capita GDP catch-
up result, followed by Spain, Portugal and, albeit to a lesser extent Greece. Our
findings suggest that their growth may have benefited from membership of the
European Union, but also that the progress of each of the country is greatly
determined by its own growth strategy.28
As for the nature of the real convergence process, the most salient
differences have to do on the one hand with equity and on the other with the
composition of the capitalization efforts. Thus, Portugal and above all Ireland
have shown, in comparison with the other countries, little ability to make
compatible growth with social protection. Moreover, in a clear contrast with its
counterparts, the share of social protection expenditures in GDP of the Irish
economy has recorded a significant reduction over the period. Thus, it is now
noticeably below the EU average. This feature of the growth pattern of Ireland is
also supported by the relatively high value of its Gini index for income
inequality.
Regarding the across-countries differences in the strategies of
capitalization, the most prominent ones are summarized as follows. First, we
should mention the extraordinary importance of direct investment inflows in the
case of Ireland. Indeed, the capability of the Irish economy to attract capital
from abroad clearly stands out even with relation to the other EU cohesion
countries, Spain and Portugal, which have also been very attractive for foreign
investors.  In fact, the attraction of direct international capital, mostly from the
United States, together with the emphasis place on the development of human
capital seem to be the most important factors in the Irish story of rapid growth
and per capita GDP convergence. It is reasonable to think, however, that the
growth strategy followed by Ireland  -greatly based on developing human capital
and harnessing international spillovers-  would not have probably been
successful in the absence of a good endowment in domestic R&D and public
infrastructures. In addition, it is worth mentioning the heavier emphasis of
Ireland on the provision of telecommunication and Internet infrastructures.
Secondly, we should underline the more intensive and better distributed
(among all kinds of capital assets) efforts of capitalization that the Spanish
economy has made in an attempt to overcome its higher shortcomings at the
beginning of the period.29
Finally, as far as the likely implications of EU membership, we should
note the positive role which seems to have played the EU regional policy,
particularly in the case of Ireland.
Considered in overall, the real convergence stories of the four less
developed EU members offer, albeit with striking differences between them, a
rather successful example of a catch-up process in the framework of an
ambitious regional integration process. Thus, interesting lessons may be drawn
for the CEECs that are likely to join the EU in the near future. This is, in fact, the
subject of the next section of our paper.
5. Lessons for the Central and Eastern European candidates
This section discusses the main lessons that can be drawn from the
catch-up experiences of the four less-developed EU members for the ten
CEECs that have already started accession negotiations, namely: Bulgaria, the
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, the
Slovak Republic and Slovenia. However, before this discussion, it offers a broad
picture of the economic performance of the CEECs since their almost
overlapping transition and EU accession processes.
Over the last decade –since the collapse of the communist system and
the dissolution of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA)- the
CEECs have made tremendous progress in establishing a democratic market
economy, in the framework of the process of EU accession, which began with
the signing of the European Association Agreements (EAs) between the CEECs
and the EU
14. Progress has been, however, rather uneven among the ten.
Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, Estonia and Slovenia have been making
the most progress, so that they were the first group of candidates to begin (in
March, 1998) the round of negotiations prior to membership. Nevertheless, later
on, at the Council of Helsinki (in December, 1999) the other CEECs also began
                                                
14 The EAs were signed on the following dates: Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland
(December, 1991); Romania (February, 1993); Bulgaria (March, 1993); Czech and Slovak
Republics (October, 1993) Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (June, 1995); and Slovenia (June,
1996).30
full negotiations. Since then, therefore, the scope and the pace of the
enlargement have been determined by the  advances of each candidate in
attaining membership requirements
15.
As shown in TABLE 4, since they began their transition process the
majority of the CEECs have grown at much higher rates than their future EU
partners, in spite of the important contraction in output that they suffered in the
early years of transition. Consequently, most of the ten candidates have
shortened the gap between their  per capita  GDP with that of the EU.
Nevertheless, the per capita GDP of the CEECs, even when expressed in PPS,
is still very much lower than the EU average. The growth recovery of the
CEECs has largely been due to improvements in labor productivity, which, until
recently, have been accompanied by a deterioration in unemployment rates.
[TABLE 4, around here]
The transition to the market system and open trade, together with
considerable amounts of foreign capital in the form of foreign direct investments
(FDI), have been key factors in increasing the labour productivity and the output
of the CEECs. In fact, trade of goods and services has experienced such rapid
growth over the last decade that many CEECs are now more open to trade than
the EU. Similarly, in some of the most advanced candidate countries the share
of cumulative FDI inflows over GDP is higher than in the EU (see TABLE 5).
[TABLE 5, around here]
In addition, trade and FDI have greatly contributed to generating a
dramatic change in GDP composition: the weight of agriculture has been largely
reduced in favour of industry and services. In this sense, redirection of exports
from the CMEA to the EU markets accompanied by industrial restructuring and
                                                
15 These requirements are the so-called Copenhagen criteria (adopted in June, 1993), namely:
(i) to achieve stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and
respect for and protection of minorities; (ii) to have a functioning market economy  as well as the
capacity to cope with the competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; and (iii) to31
the novo private activities, both involving foreign investment, have been the
main driving forces of the changes in the patterns of specialization of the
CEECs, which reflect a convergence trend towards those of the EU. More
specifically, due to the strategies of the multinationals there has been a shift in
exports of some CEECs – particularly in Hungary, the Czech Republic and
Estonia- away from unskilled labour-intensive goods toward high-skilled, labour-
intensive and technology-based products (see World Bank, 2000 and
references therein).
In short, many empirical studies have found that trade and above all FDI
appear to have been crucial in promoting industrial restructuring, technological
upgrading of products, improvements in productivity, export growth and hence,
overall economic growth in the CEECs.
In turn, it seems that the process of EU accession has played an
important role in attracting FDI to the CEECs (EBRD, 1999). However, given the
differential performance exhibited by the ten CEECs,  it is clear that participation
in the EU integration process alone is not sufficient: there are other factors that
should be important in attracting FDI. In this respect, in Kaminski and Riboud
(2000) it is argued that the case of Hungary – the country that up to now has
received the highest FDI inflows in both GDP and per capita terms- illustrates
some of the additional factors that are important for attracting FDI. Thus, in
addition to the emphasis that Hungary placed on foreign investors during its
privatization process, the significant progress in macroeconomic stabilization,
structural reforms and institutional developments have proved to be essential
factors for explaining its brilliant performance in attracting FDI. On the other
hand, the poor experiences in macroeconomic stabilization and structural
reforms exhibited by Bulgaria and Romania -the countries that have received
the smallest FDI inflows in per capita terms and suffered the worst economic
performance- somehow support the same diagnosis.
                                                                                                                                              
have the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of
political, economic and monetary union.32
Last but not least, differences in growth performance and hence in per
capita GDP levels across the ten CEECs appear to be related to differences in
their investment efforts in technological and human capital. In other words,
although trade and FDI have probably been serving as a vehicle for
international technological spillovers, domestic investment in R&D and in
education seem to have been essential ingredients in enabling some CEECs to
move to higher growth and income convergence.
Indeed, although data limitations preclude a detailed analysis of those
issues (as the one done for the EU members) in the case of the CEECs, the
indicators reported in TABLE 6 suggest that the growth performance of the
candidates is somehow associated with their respective efforts in R&D and
education, which for many of them appear to be quite close to the EU
standards. 
16 In constrast, data on Internet and transport infrastructure shows,
with very few exceptions, the relatively weak position of the CEECs.
[TABLE 6, around here]
In conclusion, our review of the progress made by the CEECs since their
almost overlapping transition and EU accession processes suggests that the
upcoming accession could contribute significantly to improving their prospects
of growth and income convergence towards EU levels. Thus,  the experience
over the last decade has illustrated that the ongoing process of integration into
the EU has helped to attract FDI to the CEECs, which, in turn, has contributed
to the growth and the technological and skill upgrading of output and exports.
However, the experience of the CEECs has also shown that the differentials
found across their economic performance since their accession process began
has to be explained on the basis of additional factors which have more to do
with their own economic policies. In this respect, the progress in
macroeconomic stabilization, structural reforms and institutional development,
                                                
16 It should be noted, however, that such an indicator of human capital endowments does not
take into consideration the significant differences  that seem to exist in the quailty of education
systems between the CEECs and the current EU members.33
on the one hand, and investment efforts in R&D and education, on the other
should be emphasized.
Having said that, it is time to go back to the better known cases of the
less developed EU members, which we analyzed in greater depth in the
previous section, in order to draw additional and sounder lessons for the
CEECs about the most suitable policies for achieving sustained growth and real
convergence towards the higher standard of living of the EU.
To begin with, it is important to point out that, all in all, the catch-up
experiences of the EU members serve to reinforce most of the lessons which
have been drawn from those of the CEECs and to add new ones. Indeed, what
we have learnt in our evaluation of the real convergence experiences of the EU
cohesion countries can be summarized in the following points:
•   Since their entry into the EU the four laggard members have succeeded in
bringing their relative per capita GDP closer to the EU average, although
there are large differences between them. Ireland is the most successful of
the four and Greece the least. In all cases, excepting the one of Greece,
membership seems to be associated with a speeding up of the catch-up
process. So, on this basis, there is little reason to fear that the accession of
the CEECs is going to lead to spontaneous income divergence.
Nevertheless, the poor performance of Greece during the early years of its
membership suggests that joining the EU does not in itself guarantee
income convergence.
•  In any event, here we have argued the insufficiency of per capita GDP as an
indicator to provide a good assessment of real convergence and we have,
therefore, underlined the need to use other complementary variables that
somehow take into account the degree of income inequality. We have
argued also the convenience of including additional variables that reflect the
capability of the countries (regions) in question for achieving a self-sustained
economic growth. Moreover, by assessing the real convergence
performance of the EU cohesion countries on the basis of this set of34
variables, we have found a more complex but surely also more realistic
picture of it, which may provide more fruitful lessons for the CEEC
candidates.
•  Thus, the evidence, particularly the case of Ireland, suggests that even
when there is a brilliant  per capita  GDP catch-up performance some
problems of inequality may emerge.
•  The evidence of the four supports the idea about the link between
macroeconomic stability and income convergence. In this sense, the striking
differences found in the evidence available between Greece and Ireland, as
for the contribution of EU regional policy to real convergence, indicate that it
cannot compensate for the lack of a stable, growth-promoting environment.
•  The EU cohesion countries' experiences also clearly support the theoretical
predictions of the recent growth literature that emphasizes the crucial role of
technological knowledge, human capital and infrastructure for achieving real
convergence.
•  In addition, our findings are in agreement with the models that suggest that
the countries can take advantage of international technological spillovers
though imports and FDI, provided they have a good human capital
endowment.
•  Finally, the importance of the telecommunication and Internet facilities in
promoting growth is an additional lesson to be drawn.
6.  Final remarks
The lessons provided by the diverse experiences of real convergence of the
EU cohesion countries summarized above may be useful for the elaboration of
suitable strategies of accession for the CEEC candidates.35
Thus, it appears to be clear that although accession is likely to be propitious
for the creation of a stable macroeconomic environment that favours
investment, it cannot be a substitute for the necessary domestic policies to
achieve it. In addition, there is little doubt that domestic efforts to improve
human capital endowments and infrastructure are essential ingredients for
taking advantage of the potential economic gains of integration in terms of
growth and real convergence. Moreover, there are good grounds for believing
that the future members should also undertake suitable policies to cope with the
problems of income distribution.
Consequently, fiscal consolidation, accompanied by a public finance
restructuring that helps to make room for the above-mentioned investments
needed to achieving sustained high long-term growth, is one of the main
challenges facing the CEECs for a successful integration in terms of real
convergence. Moreover, such public finance restructuring should also meet the
objective of providing affordable social insurance programmes in the most
efficient way and avoiding the creation of work disincentives.
Needless to say, the development of institutions and policies aimed at the
improvement of the level of economic efficiency with which resources are
allocated should also be considered as an essential piece in the CEECs
strategy for a successful accession. Moreover, establishing a functioning market
economy is one of the prerequisites of accession that the CEECs need to
complete with first.
For undertaking all those reforms of economic institutions and policies the
CEECs can count on the financial assistance of the EU, but it seems to be clear
that, in order to assure efficient use of this the CEECs need to build up an
administrative capacity (with a professionalized civil service) that allows
appropriate monitoring and evaluation of public investment projects.
In short, it may be stated that the CEECs have to confront (in fact are
already confronting) a huge task in order to meet what, in the end, is the36
ultimate economic goal of accession: convergence towards the higher
standards of living of their future partners in the EU. But, as the experiences of
the less developed EU members suggest so far, in spite of its difficulty this task
is likely to be worthwhile.37
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Figure 1. Relation between Welfare expenditure and Inequality in EU countries
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 Source: EUROSTAT , Luxembourg Income Study, United Nations Development Programme
and own elaboration
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TABLE 1. BREAKDOWN OF PER CAPITA GDP GROWTH INTO ITS COMPONENTS
(1980-1998)






GDP per capita 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
     Labour productivity    75,1 86,2 85,7 71,0 96,1 67,7
          Hourly productivity       60,1 114,1 86,8 88,4 108,9 67,7
               Pure hourly growth effect
15,9
112,3 111,1 63,4 96,1 73,2
               Structural change effect in hourly
               productivity growth 48,1
20,4 3,9 47,0 28,5 23,5
               Residual effect          -
3,9
-18,6 -28,2 -22,0 -15,7 -29,0
          Working time       15,0 -27,9 -1,1 -17,4 12,8 0,0
     Employment rate    24,9 13,8 14,3 29,0 3,9 32,3
          Employment/Labour force       -38,0 -16,1 -2,9 4,2 -10,5 7,5
          Activity rate       44,6 14,2 6,3 12,8 6,6 28,8
          Population 15-64 years/Total
population
      18,3 15,7 10,9 12,0 7,8 -4,0
Pro memoria:
GDP per capita growth 25.2 49.6 130.3 65.0 39.4 35.1
Source: EUROSTAT, OECD, ILO and own elaboration45
Figure 3. Breakdown of the GDP growth
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Employment rate Employment/Labour force Activity rate Population 15-64 years/Total Population
Source: EUROSTAT, OECD, ILO and own elaboration46


















































USA in 1980 USA in 1999
Source: EUROSTAT, OECD, ILO, UNESCO and own elaboration48



































Unemployment Human capital Technological
Capital
Greece 67 21,5 10,3 21,2 3,3
Spain 82 21,4 15,9 35,1 6,7
Ireland 112 17,1 6,6 34,6 10,7
Portugal 75 21,8 4,7 24 4,9
European
Union
100 27,9 9,2 49,9 15,8
United
States




















United States European Union
Source: EUROSTAT, OECD, ILO, UNESCO and own elaboration50
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Figure 6: Capital endowment (cont.)
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Greece Spain Ireland Portugal
Figure 8. Foreign Direct Investment inflows
as a % of GDP54
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(*) Chemical products, Office and data processing machines, Electrical goods and Communication 
services55


































Source: EUROSTAT, OECD and United Nations
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Source: OECD, Netcraft and Internet Society
 















Source: OECD, Netcraft and Internet Society
Source: EUROSTAT, OECD, UN, Network Wizards, Internet Society, Netcraft and own
elaboration56
Table 2. Key macroeconomic indicators
1980 1986 1993 1999
Inflation rate
Greece 24.7 23.0 14.4 2.7
Spain 15.5 8.8 4.6 2.3
Ireland 18.3 3.8 1.4 1.6
Portugal 16.6 11.8 6.7 2.3
EU 13.1 3.7 3.6 1.1
USA 13.5 1.9 3.0 2.1
Long-term interest rate
Greece 17.1 15.8 19.3 6.3
Spain 16.0 11.4 10.1 4.7
Ireland 15.4 11.1 6.7 4.7
Portugal 16.7 19.5 9.5 4.8
EU 12.8 9.2 7.8 4.7
USA 10.8 8.1 5.8 6.1
Public gross debt
Greece 23.9 53.6 111.6 104.4
Spain 17.5 45.1 58.8 63.5
Ireland 70.3 113.8 93.1 52.4
Portugal 32.4 68.0 63.2 56.8
EU 38.4 54.5 65.8 68.1
USA 37.0 52.3 63.4 54.2
Public budget deficit(*)
Greece 2.6 9.5 13.8 1.6
Spain 2.6 5.7 6.8 1.1
Ireland 12.1 10.5 2.3 (2.0)
Portugal 8.7 5.9 6.1 2.0
EU 3.5 4.2 6.2 0.7
USA  1.7  3.8  3.9  (1.7)
Source: OECD, EUROSTAT and IMF
(*) The data in brackets show a budget surplus57
TABLE 3. COMMUNITY BUDGET: NET BALANCE OF THE EU COUNTRIES
               (% of GDP)
Country 1986-88 1989-93 1994-98
Austria -0,3
Belgium -0,5 -0,2 -0,4
Denmark 0,4 0,3 0,1
Finland -0,1
France -0,1 -0,2 -0,1
Germany -0,5 -0,6 -0,7
Greece 2,8 4,2 4,2
Holland 0,3 -0,1 -0,7
Ireland 4,2 5,3 3,7
Italy 0,0 -0,1 -0,2
Luxembourg -1,0 0,7 0,0
Portugal 1,0 2,3 2,9
Spain 0,2 0,5 1,3
Sweden -0,4
United Kingdom -0,3 -0,3 -0,3
Sources: European Court of Auditors: Annual Report; European Commission: The Community
Budget. The Facts in Figures.58
TABLE 4. MAIN MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS
Bulgaria Czech Rep. Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia European
Union
Surface (km2) 110,910 78,864 45,100 93,030 64,589 65,200 312,677 237,500 48,845 20,256 3,231,000
Population-on january 1999

































































































































































































Sources: Economic and Financial Affairs Directorate General of the European Commission (europa.eu.int), World Bank and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development59
TABLE 5. SOURCES OF TECHNOLOGICAL SPILLOVERS
















Bulgaria 44.1 -6.4 51.9 -9.6 18.5
Czech R. 62.7 9.0 63.9 12.6 29.4
Estonia 76.9 9.8 82.6 11.3 33.2
Hungary 52.6 6.4 55.0 8.4 37.5
Latvia 46.7 0.6 57.6 1.6 35.2
Lithuania 39.8 - 50.1 - 19.6
Poland 28.4 11.6 33.6 17.7 12.8
Romania 30.1 4.6 34.6 4.4 15.9
Slovakia 64.8 11.3 69.9 8.3 10.2
Slovenia 55.7 0.6 58.4 4.5 6.3
European
Union
34.6 6.7 33.2 6.1 15.2
Sources: World Bank (for the CEECs), EUROSTAT and UN (for the EU) and own elaboration60
TABLE 6. FACTORS CONDUCIVE TO REAL CONVERGENCE
Km of motorways in 1999 (2) Expenditure for
R&D in 1996 (%
GDP) (1)
Mean school years in 1998 of
the population 15-64 years (3)
Internet connections per
1000 inhabitants in 1999
(2)




Bulgaria 0.57 8.4 3.2 2.92 3.95
Czech R. 1.11 10.0 19.4 6.31 4.84
Estonia 0.57 9.0 18.3 1.91 6.01
Hungary 0.68 10.6 13.6 4.45 4.82
Latvia 0.48 9.1 3.4 - -
Lithuania 0.70 8.9 - 6.39 11.27
Poland 0.77 11.0 2.6 0.86 0.69
Romania 0.72 9.1 0.6 0.48 0.50
Slovakia 1.05 7.7 7.2 6.02 5.47
Slovenia 1.46 9.9 9.9 19.68 20.09
European
Union
1.80 9.1 44.0 15.36 13.22
Source: (1) OECD, (2) European Commision, (3) Own elaboration on the basis of UNESCO, OECD and EUROSTAT data